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ARTICLES 
THE WORLD WAR II GERMAN 
SABOTEURS' CASE AND WRITS OF 
CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT BY THE 
COURT OF APPEALS: AT ALE OF NUNC 
PRO TUNC JURISDICTION 
Boris /. Bittker* 
Professor David J. Danelski has recently published an ex-
cellent account and analysis of the trial by military commission 
of the eight German saboteurs who landed on the beaches of 
Long Island and Florida during World War II, and of Ex parte 
Quirin, in which the Supreme Court, after two days of oral ar-
gument at an unusual special session called by Chief Justice 
Stone, upheld the constitutionality of the military commission's 
jurisdiction.1 Like other commentators, Professor Danelski fo-
* Sterling Professor of Law Emeritus, Yale University. 
I am grateful to Ernest W. Jennes and Louis J. Hector, my colleagues at the junior 
end of Oscar S. Cox's legal staff in the summer of 1942, to Lloyd Cutler, Deputy Gen-
eral Counsel of Lend-Lease Administration, and to Bennet Boskey (law clerk to Chief 
Justice Stone when Ex parte Quirin was argued and decided), for reading and com-
menting on a draft of this article. I claim full responsibility and credit, however, for all 
errors of fact and judgment. 
1. David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. of S. Ct. Hist. 61 (1 YY6) 
(commenting on Ex parte Quirin, 17 U.S 1 (1942)). For the drafting of this opinion, see 
Boskey, A Justice's Papers: Chief Justice Stone's Biography and the Saboteurs' Case, 14 
S. Ct. Hist. Soc. Q. 10 (1993). 
For a detailed but lively narrative account of "Pastorious" (the German code name 
for the sabotage project), see Eugene Rachlis, They Came to Kill: The Story of Eight 
Nazi Saboteurs in America (Random House, 1961). The arresting title is taken from a 
radio broadcast by J. Edgar Hoover, but there is no evidence that killing was a major, or 
even a subsidiary, goal of the would-be saboteurs. This was not the only instance of 
Hoover's penchant for exaggeration. Thus, he attributed the unmasking of the sabo-
teurs to extraordinary sleuthing by the FBI, although the proximate cause was the defec-
tion of one of the saboteurs, whose first attempt to inform on his colleagues was brushed 
off by the FBI's New York office as the fantasy of a harmless crank. He then went to 
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cuses primarily on the central issue in Ex parte Quirin- the con-
stitutional power of a military commission to try persons appre-
hended in the United States when the federal and state courts 
were open and functioning. Not surprisingly, the commentators, 
including Professor Danelski, have given little attention to two 
threshold issues that were the subject of intense inquiry during 
the oral argument but then faded from the forensic scene. 
These preliminary issues were (1) whether the petitioners in 
Ex parte Quirin (the would-be saboteurs) had the right to seek 
any remedy in the federal courts and (2) whether the Supreme 
Court had jurisdiction to entertain and pass on their petitions 
for habeas corpus. Despite the fact that President Roosevelt's 
Proclamation of July 2, 1942, entitled "Denying Enemies Access 
to the Courts of the United States," 2 seemed to deny the Quirin 
petitioners all access to the federal courts, the first issue gave 
the Court little trouble: both during oral arguments and in the 
ultimate opinion, the Court easily- but without any analysis-
concluded that the petitioners could properly seek the assistance 
of the federal courts. The more ticklish threshold issue was 
whether the Supreme Court itself had jurisdiction, and it is to 
that question that I now turn. 
Washington, called the United States Government Information Service to inquire about 
the difference between the FBI and the Secret Service, was told to call a Colonel 
Kramer of the Army's General Staff Corps, found that Kramer was not in his office, 
then called the FBI's Washington office, and finally reached someone who took his 
claim seriously. See id. at 156-59. Another comic feature portrayed by the Rachlis book 
is the contrast between the stereotypically Teutonic training program in Germany and 
the trainees themselves, a lumpenproletariat of slovenly and quarrelsome misfits who, if 
they had eluded capture, might well have blown up themselves rather than their desig-
nated targets. 
2. The proclamation decreed: 
That all persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with 
the United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any 
such nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United 
States or any territory or possession thereof, through coastal or boundary de-
fenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit 
sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war, 
shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals; 
and that such persons shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any 
proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceedings 
sought on their behalf, in the courts of the United States, or of its states, territo· 
ries, and possessions, except under such regulations as the Attorney General, 
with the aproval of the Secretary of War, may from time to time prescribe. 
56 Stat. 1964 (1942) (emphasis added). 
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The second threshold question in Ex parte Quirin was 
whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to pass on the peti-
tioners' applications for habeas corpus. If the Court had found 
it necessary to answer this question at the end of the first day of 
oral argument, the answer (as explained below) would have 
been "no." But its jurisdiction was established, retroactively so 
to speak, by a procedural episode that occurred between the 
first and second days of argument. This switch in time led Pro-
fessor Robert E. Cushman, the author of the first published 
scholarly analysis of Ex parte Quirin, to observe that "the 
Court's jurisdiction caught up with the Court just at the finish 
line. "3 
Because I was personally involved in this race to the court-
house steps, I am shifting to the first person singular for the rest 
of this narrative account.4 
I arrived in Washington in the summer of 1942, one year 
out of law school, to join the legal staff of the Lend-Lease Ad-
ministration, whose general counsel was Oscar S. Cox. He was 
an energetic, resourceful, and self-assured lawyer, who had 
come to the attention of the White House (especially Harry 
Hopkins) and of Attorney General Francis Biddle as a principal 
draftsman of the Lend-Lease Act. His skills led quickly to his 
additional appointment as Assistant Solicitor General, who in 
those days was responsible for drafting two categories of docu-
ments: the Executive Orders by which President Roosevelt cre-
ated, reshuffled, and reorganized the myriad of war-time agen-
cies, and the Opinions of the Attorney General, which were 
especially important in interpreting the Second War Powers Act 
and other statutes affecting military procurement and other war-
time activities. Mr. Cox held his Lend-Lease and Justice De-
partment posts concurrently, and those wide responsibilities 
were augmented by still a third appointment, as general counsel 
for the Office of Emergency Management, a kind of executive 
holding company for the wartime operating agencies. His glit-
tering reputation, enhanced by the reputations of his associates 
3. Robert E. Cushman, Ex parte Quirin et al.- The Nazi Saboteur Case, 28 
Cornell L.Q. 54,58 (1942). 
4. I made no contemporaneous notes, but have relied on my recollection, as re-
freshed and corrected after consulting the meager documents available in the Supreme 
Court and Franklin D. Roosevelt Libraries. 
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(including George Ball, Lloyd Cutler, Myres MacDougal, and 
Eugene Rostow), was a magnet for ambitious younger lawyers, 
especially graduates of Yale, Mr. Cox's own school. 
On reporting for work, I was greeted briefly by Mr. Cox, 
but then saw little of him in the Lend-Lease offices. This was 
because he was almost wholly absorbed in preparing the legal 
basis for the prosecution of the eight saboteurs and then in as-
sisting Mr. Biddle in the trial before the military commission. 
These functions did not fit within the job descriptions of any of 
Cox's three official posts, but they reflected his reputation as a 
can-do lawyer who brought imagination and verve to any project 
that attracted his attention. In contrast to the Criminal Division 
of the Justice Department, which questioned the constitutional-
ity and wisdom of a military trial when the federal courts were 
open and functioning normally, Mr. Cox vigorously supported 
the military route. 
According to gossip i!l the corridors of the Justice Depart-
ment, the White House hoped that the drama of a military trial 
would help to convince the public that we were really at war, 
and to end the civilian complacency that prevailed even in 1942, 
six months after the debacle at Pearl Harbor. A military trial 
would also make death sentences possible, whereas the most 
heinous statutory federal crime for which the saboteurs could be 
prosecuted in the federal courts was probably conspiracy to 
commit a federal crime under the general conspiracy (§ 3?1 of 
Title 18), which at that time carried only a 2-year sentence.' In-
deed, some corridor wits sardonically speculated that a prosecu-
tion in the regular federal courts might have to charge the sabo-
teurs with such ludicrous offenses as entering the United States 
without valid passports or visas, importing explosives in viola-
tion of customs regulations, and failing to register for the draft 
under the Selective Service Act. The latter suggestion seemed 
(and was of course intended to seem) especially ridiculous, but 
life can imitate even satirical art: One of the petitioners actually 
5. This bam door was closed in 1948, when conspiracy to destroy war material or 
war premises was given its own statutory status, with a maximum penalty of 30 years. 
See 48 Stat. 799 (1948). 
For the 1942 views of the Attorney General, see Danelski, The Saboteur's Case, I J. 
of S. Ct. Hist. at 61 (cited in note 1) ("clearest offense was attempted sabotage [which] 
would be difficult to prove"); for additional reasons for the use of a military commission, 
see id. 
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registered for the draft after his surreptitious entry into the 
United States and before he was taken into custody by the FBI.6 
The corridor speculation about possible offenses may have 
leaked out and inspired a popular cartoonist to portray J. Edgar 
Hoover holding the prisoners while the Attorney General stood 
on a ladder in front of an array of law books, saying "You hold 
on to them, Edgar, and I'll find something here that we can 
punish them under."7 
The military commission, operating in secrecy except for 
terse public announcements, completed hearing the evidence on 
Monday, July 27, 1942, and adjourned for several days so that 
counsel could prepare their closing arguments. On the same 
day, Chief Justice Stone announced that the Supreme Court 
would convene on Wednesday in a special session. On the 
Tuesday between these two events, Mr. Cox summoned me 
from my Lend-Lease office to the Justice Department, where he 
and Lloyd Cutler informed me that Colonel Kenneth Royall, 
chief counsel for the saboteurs (and later Secretary of the 
Army), needed some help with his habeas corpus applications to 
the Supreme Court. They also informed me, to my surprise, that 
I must be well versed in federal practice and procedure because 
I had recently completed a clerkship with Judge Jerome N. 
Frank of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
I was given no time to disclaim knowledge of such matters, 
or to explain that the very few procedural and jurisdictional is-
sues arising during my clerkship had been brought to the court's 
attention by counsel. Moreover, all I remembered about federal 
jurisdiction from my first-year course in civil procedure was that 
diversity jurisdiction was an antiquated procedural device ex-
ploited by wicked corporations to make life difficult for widows 
and orphans whose breadwinners had died in industrial acci-
dents. There were obviously scores of experts in other offices of 
the Justice Department who knew more about federal jurisdic-
tion than I; indeed, the real challenge would have been to find 
anyone who knew less. But I was already familiar with Mr. 
Cox's view that anything an expert could do, his staff could do 
better, so I demurred not, and went whistling in the dark to 
Colonel Royall. 
6. Rachlis, They Came to Kill at 119 (cited in note 1). 
7. Id. at 172-73. 
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When I reported to Colonel Royall, my dismay deepened. 
He told me that his pre-war law practice in North Carolina had 
seldom taken him into the federal courts, and that the arrival of 
an expert like me was therefore the best news he had received in 
days. He also said that in applying to the Supreme Court for 
writs of habeas corpus, he intended to rely on the Court's power 
to issue "extraordinary writs," as recognized by "the Civil War 
cases." I inferred that Colonel Royall had not had time to delve 
deeply into these issues, and that he had probably taken his lead 
in this procedural plan from conversations with Cox or Cutler. 
Colonel Royall then said that his brief was being shepherded 
through the Government Printing Office for presentation to the 
Supreme Court the next day, before the start of the oral argu-
ment, and that no copy was available for me. (When I later saw 
the briefs for both sides, I found that they discussed the first 
threshold issue- the legal status of the President's court-closing 
proclamation-at length, but both assumed without discussion 
that if the petitioners were entitled to sue, the Supreme Court 
had jurisdiction to hear and pass on their applications for habeas 
corpus.) Finally, Colonel Royall informed me that he was fo-
cusing wholly on preparing his oral presentation before the Su-
preme Court, which was to commence on the following day; and 
he instructed me to use my own judgment if any problems arose 
because he and his assistant (another military lawyer) would be 
unavailable in the interim even for consultation. 
Leaving Colonel Royall in his unjustifiably euphoric mood, 
I went immediately to the Department of Justice Library, where 
I worked until late Tuesday night, without knowledge of the fate 
of the defense's simultaneous ap~lication to the federal district 
judge for a writ of habeas corpus. I was initially stymied by my 
inability to find any reference to "extraordinary" writs in the of-
ficial index to Title 28 of the United States Code,9 but I then 
dredged up Section 451, providing as follows: 
The Supreme Court and the district courts shall have power to 
issue writs of habeas corpus. w 
8. Ex parte Quirin, 47 F. Supp. 431 (D.D.C. 1942) (habeas corpus denied; under 
Proclamation of July 2, 1942, petitioners "are not privileged to seek any remedy or 
maintain any proceeding in the courts of the United States"). 
9. "Extraordinary writs" was used as a category by Robert L. Stem and Eugene 
Gressman, Supreme Court Practice (Bureau of National Affairs, 1950), but the first edi-
tion of this work was not published until1950. 
10. 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1940); for current law, see 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). 
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This provision, with a pedigree going back to§ 14 of the Ju-
diciary Act of 1789, seemed directly on point, and I learned later 
that it was the only statutory authority cited in Colonel Royall's 
brief as the basis for the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear 
and pass on the petitions for habeas corpus. 
I was, however, uneasy with § 451 's free-floating character 
and seemingly ubiquitous scope. Taken in isolation and at face 
value, it implied that any person detained anywhere in the 
United States for any allegedly unlawful reason could go 
straight to the Supreme Court for relief. Could the Court issue 
the Great Writ to any detaining agency, federal, state or local-
even to a solitary policeman-without any intervening judicial 
filter to reduce the applications to a manageable number? Even 
before immersion in the future Legal Process School of peda-
gogy, with its emphasis on husbanding the Supreme Court's time 
and energies and avoiding judicial activism, I could see that § 
451 had to be confined lest it become a Frankenstein's monster. 
I had not yet encountered the tax lawyer's maxim that if a statu-
tory provision seems too good to be true, it probably isn't; but in 
that spirit, I began to search for other provisions that might re-
strict § 451's universe. After a while, I unearthed-or perhaps 
stumbled on-§ 377 of Title 28, which a knowledgeable re-
searcher would have recognized as the "All Writs Act," provid-
ing as follows: 
The Supreme Court, the circuit courts of appeals, and the dis-
trict courts shall have power to issue all writs not specifically 
provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exer-
cise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the us-
ages and principles of law (emphasis added). 11 
Although § 377 was not labeled or indexed as authorizing 
"extraordinary" writs, it arguably was a candidate for that ap-
pellation. That, however, suggested two troublesome conclu-
sions: (1) That the "extraordinary" writ authority that Colonel 
Royall had charged me with investigating was inapplicable, since 
§ 377 by its own terms did not apply to writs that were 
"specifically provided for by [some other] statute" (e.g., § 451, 
for habeas corpus); and (2) that while the writs authorized by § 
377 could be issued only if they were ancillary to the court's ju-
II. 28 U.S.C. § 377 (1940); for current law. see 28 U.S.C. § 1651. 
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risdiction, maybe § 451- despite my misgivings -could some-
how create, not merely build upon, the Court's jurisdiction.12 
Remembering Colonel Royall's references to Civil War 
precedents, I hoped that my uncertainties about § 451 might be 
dispelled by a dose of history. Neither Ex parte Milligan (1866) 
nor Ex parte McCardle (1867)-the best known judicial re-
sponses to domestic martial law under President Lincoln-
proved to be fruitful, 13 but Ex parte Yerger (1868) seemed more 
promising. 14 Indeed, at first blush, it was the answer to a fledg-
ling lawyer's prayers. In Yerger, the Supreme Court held that it 
had jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into 
the constitutional validity of a judgment by the Circuit Court for 
the Southern District of Mississippi, remanding a civilian for 
trial by a military commission on a charge of murder under an 
1867 Reconstruction statute, entitled "To Provide for the More 
Efficient Government of the Rebel states." 15 The facts were suf-
ficiently similar to those in Ex parte Quirin (or would be if the 
district court denied habeas corpus to the Quirin petitioners-an 
event that actually occurred while I was in the library)-except 
12. The original version of the All Writs Act (§ 14 of the Judiciary Act of 24 Sep-
tember, 1789) included both habeas corpus and other writs, with a "pursuant to the is-
suing court's jurisdiction" constraint. It is not clear, however, whether this qualification 
applied to both habeas corpus and other writs, or only to the latter. For this common 
problem of interpretation, see LeCierq, Doctrine of the Last Antecedent: The Mystifying 
Morass of Ambiguous Modifiers, 1966 J. of Legal Writing Institute 81. 
13. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), ruled that the Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction to answer questions certified to it by the Circuit Court for the District of In-
diana. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1876), held that the Supreme Court 
had jurisdiction over appeals from a circuit court, whether the latter's judgment was 
rendered on appeal from the district court or in an exercise of its own original jurisdic-
tion. Neither of these rulings sheds light on the procedural issue I was concerned with, 
viz., the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to grant writs of habeas corpus to the Quirin 
petitioners. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte 
McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229 (1973). 
14. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868). For an extended account of the 
Yerger case's tortuous history, see Charles Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88 at 6 (MacMillan, 1971 ). 
15. In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the government's claim that its ju-
risdiction had been eliminated as respects pending cases by the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1868 (15 Stat. 44 (1868)), enacted in the wake of the McCardle case. Yerger also held 
that the Court's power to grant writs of habeas corpus (at least pursuant to its appellate 
jurisdiction) is not limited to cases of confinement by a lower court, but also encom-
passes cases of imprisonment under military authority. 
For precursors of Yerger, see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), acutely 
analyzed in David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred 
Years, 1789-1888 at 79-82 (U. of Chicago Press, 1985), and Ex parte Siebold 100 U.S. 371 
(1879) (when habeas corpus is sought in case falling within the appellate jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court, writ can be granted only if detention is by a tribunal lacking in juris-
diction, not one that has jurisdiction but has allegedly committed error). 
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for a subsequent change in the judicial federal hierarchy. This 
difference was that in 1869 there was no intermediate court be-
tween the circuit court (where Yerger's judicial journey began) 
and the Supreme Court, while the petitioners in Ex parte Quirin 
could, if they lost in the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia before going on to interrupt the Supreme Court's sum-
mer vacation. Although there were some precedents-mostly 
rather antiquated-for employing habeas corpus as a substitute 
for certiorari/6 its use to evade the intermediate scrutiny of the 
Court of Appeals was something else again. 
The controlling statute on this issue was § 238 of the Judi-
cial Code (28 U.S.C. § 345 (1940)), providing that "direct review 
by the Supreme Court of an interlocutory or final judgment or 
decree of a district court may be had where it is so provided in 
[certain specified provisions, none of them applicable to Quirin] 
and not otherwise" (Emphasis added). A corollary of this pro-
vision was § 128 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C. § 225), provid-
ing that "[t]he circuit courts of appeal shall have appellate juris-
diction to review by appeal final decisions ... [i]n the district 
courts, in all cases save where a direct review of the decision 
may be had in the Supreme Court under section 345 of this ti-
tle." 
Taken together, these provisions left little room for the use 
of habeas corpus to bring a district court judgment to the Su-
preme Court without stopping en route in the circuit court of 
appeals. Moreover, in Ex parte Mirzan, the Court had an-
nounced its distaste for so-called "original" petitions for habeas 
corpus: 
As ... an appeal lies to this court from the judgments of the 
Circuit Courts in habeas corpus cases, this court will not issue 
such a writ, even if it has the power . .. if there are no special 
circumstances in the case. 17 
16. See Reynolds Robertson and Francis R. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court of the United States 847 (West, 1936); Robert L. Stern, Eugene Gressman, Stephen 
M. Shapiro and Kenneth S. Geller, Supreme Court Practice § 11.3 (Bureau of National 
Affairs, 7th ed. 1993). 
17. Ex parte Mirzan, 119 U.S. 584, 586 (1887) (emphasis added); see also Dallin H. 
Oaks, The "Original" Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. 153, 
206 (characterizing this procedure as an '"anachronism"). 
On reading Ex parte Mirzan, Colonel Royall would have found that it relied on Ex 
parte Royall Nos. I and 2, 117 U.S. 241 (181l6) and Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 254 (1886), 
m wh1ch Colonel Royall's homonym was both petitioner and counsel pro se in a habeas 
corpus case-and lost in both capacities. 
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Assuming, however, that this last clear chance to skip the 
court of appeals survived the enactment in 1911 of §§ 345 and 
225 of Title 28 (as was implied without discussion by a 1919 
case),1R Ex parte Quirin arguably met Mirzan's reference to a 
case of "special circumstances." 
Another possible rationale for skipping the court of appeals 
was that the Supreme Court's "appellate jurisdiction," as con-
ferred by Art. III of the Constitution, encompassed appeals 
from the proceedings before the military commission because it 
had enough judicial genes to bring its proceedings within the 
constitutional reference to "all cases, in law and equity, arising 
under this Constitution. "19 Perhaps this contention, which would 
render the proceedings before the district court moot, could gain 
some support from the fact that Chief Justice Stone convened 
the special session of the Supreme Court on the day before the 
habeas corpus petition was filed in the district court; arguably, it 
seemed to me, he would not have taken this precipitous step 
unless he believed that the proceedings before the military 
commission- taken in isolation- supplied a tenable basis for 
the exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction. 
In thinking about this theory in the Justice Department Li-
brary, I did not know that before the Chief Justice convened the 
special session, there had been back-channel discussions be-
tween counsel for both sides and several Justices,20 during which 
Colonel Royall might have assured the Justices that he would 
not present a naked petition to the Court, but would promptly 
go to the district court. Since Colonel Royall had not told me 
that he even contemplated the possibility of an appeal to the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, I was 
18. Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919} (granting habeas corpus to petitioner 
held for contempt by a federal district judge acting in excess of authority and arbitrar-
ily). I note that this remedy is accepted as still valid, though described as rare, by Stem, 
Gressman, and Shapiro's authoritative treatise, in their analysis of "extraordinary writs." 
Robert L. Stem, Eugene Gressman, and Stephen M. Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice 
§ 11.3 (Bureau of National Affairs, 6th ed. 1986). 
19. U.S. Const., Art. III,§ 2. For the still unresolved issue of the Supreme Court's 
power to review quasi-judicial determinations by independent governmental agencies, 
without prior involvement of a lower federal court, see 168 Charles Allen Wright, Ar-
thur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4005 (West 
Publishing, 1996); see also Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948) (no power to 
review actions of tribunal set up by General MacArthur as agent of Allied Powers be-
cause it "is not a tribunal of the United States"). Quaere: Is this rationale a negative 
pregnant, implying that a military commission established solely by United States action 
could qualify for direct review by the Supreme Court? 
20. See Danelski, 1 J. of S. Ct. Hist. at 68 (cited in note 1). 
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left with the uncomfortable feeling that the Chief Justice had 
convened the special session with no greater foundation than the 
possibility of a threshold petition for habeas corpus to the dis-
trict court, and perhaps without even that rickety infrastructure 
to support action by the Court.21 
Thus, in the end, I could find no clearcut route for Colonel 
Royall to get from the district court to the Supreme Court with-
out stopping in transit in the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia. But by the time I finished my research, about ten 
hours before the Supreme Court was to start hearing oral argu-
ment, there was no time to perfect an appeal to the court of ap-
peals, even if I could get my gloomy thoughts through to Colo-
nel Royall and convince him of their accuracy. I was uneasy 
about a petition to the Supreme Court for an "original" writ of 
habeas corpus, which was Colonel Royall's plan, without a more 
careful analysis of this procedure than time allowed. As for di-
rect review by the Supreme Court of the proceedings of the mili-
tary commission on the theory that it was a quasi-court, I was 
uncomfortable about floating this novel claim in the absence of 
any support in the precedents. 22 
I therefore set out my lugubrious conclusions in a memo-
randum and, not knowing how to reach Colonel Royall, left it in 
21. In my brief conversation with Colonel Royall, I gained the impression that he 
thought that the Supreme Court's power to issue "extraordinary" writs was an inherent 
aspect of its jurisdiction, and that the power could be exercised even in the absence of 
any underlying proceeding in a lower court. In Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske 
Stone: Pillar of the Law 657 n. * (Viking Press, 1956 ), however, the author quotes a 1952 
memorandum by Lauson Stone (the Chief Justice's son, who was part of the defense 
team until the proceedings before the Court), indicating that Royall had abandoned that 
notion after receiving a phone call from Justice Roberts, citing Marbury ~·. Madison, 
presumably for its ruling that the Supreme Court's "original jurisdiction" as conferred 
by Article III of the Constitution cannot be enlarged by Congress. I am certain that 
Colonel Royall did not entrust me with the secret of this phone call, an ex parte conver-
sation on a matter that was about to come before the Court: such an event would have 
astonished me, despite my total immersion in legal realism at the Yale Law School. 
The Lauson Stone memorandum also reports that Colonel Royall gave some 
thought to another route to the Supreme Court, viz., to treat the refusal of Justice Black 
to issue a writ of habeas corpus in his temporary capacity as a circuit judge as an order 
that could be appealed to the Supreme Court. 
I have been unable to track down the original of either Lauson Stone's narrative ac-
count of the case or his 1952 letter to Professor Mason, either in the Judge Advocate 
General's office or at the Princeton University Library, with which Professor Mason de-
posited his papers. 
22. In preparing this article, I found that I missed another possible route from the 
district court to the Supreme Court, viz., the "common law" writ of certiorari, said to be 
free of the conditions attached by Congress to the exercise of the statutory writ of certio-
rari. For this rara avis, see 168 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure§ 4005 (cited in note 19). 
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Mr. Cox's office with a request that it be transmitted as soon as 
possible to Colonel Royall, with no confidence that it would 
reach him in time to influence his oral presentation. 
ORAL ARGUMENT -FIRST DAY 
When the Supreme Court convened on Wednesday, July 29, 
Colonel Royall began his opening statement by announcing that 
"on a previous day" (i.e., the day before the argument), the peti-
tioners had applied to a judge of the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia for leave to file petitions for a writ of habeas 
corpus, and that the judge had refused to permit the petitions to 
be filed. 23 "We therefore ask," said Colonel Royall, "the consid-
eration of this present writ in the appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court. "24 Colonel Royall went on to inform the Court 
that "[t ]he question of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court 
and the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in connection with 
your appellate jurisdiction has been given careful study by the 
Attorney General's Office, as well as by ourselves, if the Court 
desires any discussion of that." The Chief Justice then asked 
Mr. Biddle if he challenged the Court's jurisdiction. "I do not," 
was the response.25 
Justice Frankfurter, however, quickly made it clear that 
Colonel Royall and the Attorney General might be unexpect-
edly harmonious comrades-in-arms, but that their agreement did 
not confer jurisdiction on the Court: 
23. Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper, eds., 39 Landmark Briefs and Argu-
ments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law (University Publica-
tions of America, 1975). Dasch, the defecting informant (see supra, note 1 ), was repre-
sented by separate counsel before the military commission and chose not to participate 
in the judicial proceedings, presumably in the hope of leniency. 
24. !d. at 497. Colonel Royall also referred to a memorandum on the jurisdictional 
issue which "was finished at quarter to twelve," i.e., fifteen minutes before the oral ar-
gument commenced, saying that "(t]here should be no difficulty in filing it." ld. at 501. 
I cannot identify this memorandum, nor did I find it in the records I consulted in writing 
this article. I suspect, however, that it was the memorandum I prepared for Colonel 
Royall or a typed or revised version of it that was completed by one of the military law-
yers after I finished my work in the early hours of the first day of argument. If so, Colo-
nel Royall was clutching at straws when he intimated that it was helpful and that he 
would file it, and it is likely that on reading it in relative tranquillity at the end of the 
first day of argument, he saw that it would be more damaging than helpful, and hence 
decided not to submit it. In any event, my doubts were in effect mooted by the later de-
cision to appeal the district judge's decision to the court of appeals. 
25. ld. at 498. 
1997] THE GERMAN SABOTEURS' CASE 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter: Will either you, Colonel Royall, or 
the Attorney General state briefly the grounds on which you 
claim this Court has jurisdiction, how it has such jurisdiction 
over an order to review [District] Justice [sic] Morris' denial 
of the petition? 
Colonel Royall: The Court is familiar with the statute which 
provides that the Supreme Court may issue a writ of habeas 
corpus. That statute must, of course, be construed consis-
tently with the Constitution of the United States, which limits 
the jurisdiction of this Court to an appellate jurisdiction. To 
give the statute any meaning at all, therefore, it must be con-
strued as being a method of appeal or a method of review. 
The ordinary methods of review are not included within the 
writ of habeas corpus. Therefore the ordinary procedure -
Mr. Justice Frankfurter: Why do you say that? 
Colonel Royall: Because a writ of habeas corpus is, in and of 
itself, a different type of writ from a writ of certiorari or any 
other method of review with which I am familiar. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter: You mean that the restriction upon 
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, Article III [i.e., that 
the Court's appellate jurisdiction is subject to "such excep-
tions and regulations" as Congress may direct], does not apply 
to habeas corpus cases? 
Colonel Royall: I think it does apply to habeas corpus, but 
habeas corpus, being provided by statute, is an additional 
method of review. By "additional method" I mean it is in ad-
dition to certiorari or any other method of review prescribed 
by law.26 
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This opaque response to Justice Frankfurter's jurisdictional 
question is reminiscent of a report, current in my law school 
days, that Professor Frankfurter had asked a trembling student 
in a moot court argument, "Counselor, how did you get here?" 
In one version of the anecdote, the student responded "By train, 
Your Honor"; in another version, the response was to faint 
away. As a graduate of the Harvard Law School, Colonel Roy-
all was no doubt familiar with this tale; his response was less 
dramatic, but not very much more informative.27 
26. Id. at 498-99. 
27. Bennett Boksey informs me of an earlier (very likely the original) version of 
this anecdote, in which the judge was Justice Holmes and the lawyer responded that he 
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Justice Frankfurter then unveiled the core of his jurisdic-
tional issue, viz., that the 1891 legislation creating the circuit 
courts of appeal28 precluded direct review of district court judg-
ments by the Supreme Court. Colonel Royall acknowledged 
that Congress had the power to restrict the Supreme Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction, but asserted that the 1891 legislation did not 
apply to habeas corpus. He went to say that this issue had been 
settled, "almost upon the exact facts [of Ex parte Quirin]" by Ex 
parte Yerger. 29 
But Justice Frankfurter pointed out that Ex parte Yerger 
had been decided before 1891. To this rejoinder, Colonel Roy-
all responded that "the position that we must take and do take 
in this matter" was that the 1891 Act did not apply to habeas 
corpus: "[A]s a practical matter, this was all that we could do." 
The practical problem, Colonel Royall explained, was that the 
Presidential Order establishing the military commission pro-
vides "for no review in the ordinary sense."30 Thus, the sen-
tences imposed by the commission (which could include the 
death penalty) might be confirmed by the President and put into 
effect before any judicial review could be sought. (Before the 
trial began, President Roosevelt had said to the Attorney Gen-
eral "I won't hand [the saboteurs] over to any United States 
marshal armed with a writ of habeas corpus Understand?")31 
"[I]t is apparent," Royall said, "that it would have been impos-
sible, even in the matter of preparing papers, if nothing else, to 
have followed anything other than this procedure," viz., an ap-
peal to the Supreme Court directly from the district court's de-
nial of habeas corpus. Colonel Royall went on, almost plain-
tively, to say: "Defense counsel conceive that it is their duty to 
assert every right which these petitioners have to assert. They 
do not conceive it to be their duty to resort to anything of a dila-
tory nature; and this is a prompt method, if sound, of dealing 
with the matter. "32 
This claim that necessity is the mother of invention did not 
sit well with Justice Frankfurter: 
got to the Court via the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 
28. 26 Stat. 826 (1891). 
29. Kurland and Casper, 39 Landmark Briefs at 499 (cited in note 23). See Yerger, 
75 U.S. at 85. 
30. Kurland and Casper, 39 Landmark Briefs at 500 (cited in note 23). 
31. Danelski, 1 J. of S. Ct. Hist. at 68 (cited in note 1). 
32. Kurland and Casper, 39 Landmark Briefs at 500 (cited in note 23). 
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter: The question on which I would like 
your view is why, after Justice [sic] Morris' denial, you did not 
take steps to appeal therefrom before the Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the District. 
Colonel Royall: Justice [sic] Morris' denial was at eight 
o'clock last night, or probably thereafter. The Commission 
meets again tomorrow [i.e., Thursday, July 30] to dispose of 
this matter, at least to hear our arguments and then to dispose 
of it as it sees fit. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter: Why could not the appeal have been 
perfected before the circuit court of appeals? That does not 
require elaborate papers. 
Colonel Royall: No, it does not. The appeal might have been 
perfected if we had had a little additional element of time. 
Mr. Chief Justice Stone: That would not affect our jurisdic-
tion.33 
445 
The Chief Justice's assertion that an appeal from the dis-
trict court to the circuit court of appeals "would not affect our 
jurisdiction" is astonishing, since as explained below, this was 
the very bridge that surmounted the jurisdictional gap that so 
troubled Justice Frankfurter. Even more remarkable, Colonel 
Royall acquiesced in the Chief Justice's remark, like a drowning 
sailor who spurns a lifeline. 
Attorney General Biddle then intervened to express his 
agreement with Colonel Royall's theory that the Supreme Court 
could use the writ of habeas corpus to review district court 
judgments as a substitute for a writ of certiorari, saying that "In 
this case your respective jurisdiction is the appellate jurisdiction 
over writs of habeas corpus." He dismissed Justice Frank-
furter's expressed fear that the Court "might be deluged with 
cases" if this procedure was accepted by asserting that the Court 
had discretionary control of its workload.34 
Justice Jackson then brought the protracted jurisdictional 
imbroglio to an end by floating a commonsense suggestion 
33. ld. at 500-01. Quaere whether Judge Morris, having been repeatedly promoted 
to Justice by both counsel and members of the Court in this argument, gained crypto-
tenure as such. 
34. Id. at 504-06. 
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which enabled the Court, at long last, to move forward and hear 
argument on the case's substantive issues: 
Mr. Justice Jackson: Would there be objection on your part to 
filing an additional piece of paper which would obviate the 
[jurisdictional] difficulty? 
The Attorney General: I do not see how I could urge any ob-
jection. If counsel wishes to file any papers, let him do so. 
Mr. Chief Justice Stone: You [i.e., Colonel Royall] may take 
that under advisement if you wish. If you want to say more on 
the jurisdictional point or file further briefs, that may be done; 
and if counsel wish to make an application for certiorari, I 
h . 35 suppose t at Is open. 
CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT BELOW-
JURISDICTION IN THE NICK OF TIME 
Immediately after the first day of oral argument, I was as-
signed (with an associate whose name I cannot now recall) to 
pursue Justice Jackson's suggestion that "an additional piece of 
paper [be filed to] obviate the difficulty." In fact, two additional 
documents were required, one to get the case from the district 
court to the court of appeals for the District of Columbia, and 
the second to bring it from there to the Supreme Court. 
The first step proved to be more troublesome than we an-
ticipated. Assuming that the record on appeal should include a 
transcript of the proceedings before the military commission,36 
we were dismayed to find that there were no extra copies on 
hand; and in any event, the transcript was a classified document 
that arguably could not be entrusted to anyone without a secu-
rity clearance, not even the appellate court clerk and staff. We 
sought to sidestep this obstacle by stipulating that the record al-
ready on file with the Supreme Court should be deemed to have 
been duly filed in the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia. The court clerk, however, refused to accept this make-
shift and no doubt unprecedented document in lieu of the tran-
script itself. 
35. Id. at 506. 
36. In hindsight, this assumption seems erroneous to me, since the record on which 
the district judge based his decision was the Presidential Proclamation closing the courts 
to the petitioners, a ground that made the testimony before the military commission 
immaterial. 
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With only a hour or so left before the Supreme Court was 
to hear the second day of oral argument, I reported this snag to 
Mr. Cox. (To be sure, my assignment was to work for Colonel 
Royall, but he was preparing for the second day of argument in 
a location not known to me.)37 Either Mr. Cox or his deputy, 
Lloyd Cutler, informed the Chief Justice of this unanticipated 
contretemps and shortly thereafter I was informed that the re-
calcitrant clerk would now accept whatever papers we gave him, 
with no questions asked. 
The final step was to petition the Supreme Court for a writ 
of certiorari to bring the case up from the court of appeals be-
fore judgment. Authority for this preemptory action was 
granted by§ 240 of the Judicial Code: 
In any case, civil or criminal, in a circuit court of appeals, or in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, it shall be competent for the Supreme Court of the 
United States, upon the petition of any party thereto, whether 
Government or other litigant, to require by certiorari, either 
before or after a judgment or decree by such lower court, that 
the cause be certified to the Supreme Court for determination 
by it with the same power and authority, and with like effect, 
as if the cause had been brought there by unrestricted ap-
peal.Js 
The underscored language authorized the Supreme Court 
to bring the case up without delay, thus achieving three objec-
tives in one fell swoop: (1) answering Justice Frankfurter's 
"How did you get here?" question; (2) enabling the Supreme 
Court to decide the case immediately, without waiting in the 
wings until the court of appeals had acted; and (3) dispelling 
Colonel Royall's fear that the petitioners might be executed be-
fore the constitutionality of the military commission had been 
decided, since there was no outstanding injunction or other judi-
cial order prohibiting the military commission and the President 
from acting at once. 
The Court granted the writ of certiorari immediately, so 
that-to quote again Professor Cushman's words-"the Court's 
37. In this episode, as throughout my work on Ex parte Quirin, there was a blurring 
of the lines of responsibility that perhaps should have evoked agonizing thoughts about 
conflicts of interest in representing one's client. If this issue had been raised at the time 
and if I had been a phrase-maker, I suppose that I would have claimed to be "counsel 
for the situation." 
38. 28 U.S.C. § 347(a) (1940) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. § 350 (1940). 
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jurisdiction caught up with the Court just at the finish line. "39 
Another way of characterizing the finale was that the writ of 
certiorari conferred legitimacy, nunc pro tunc, on the two days 
of oral argument. 
A lingering mystery in this episode is why none of the Jus-
tices drew attention during the oral argument to the Court's 
power to grant certiorari before judgment by the Court of Ap-
peals.40 Does this mean that not one of them remembered the 
language of the basic certiorari statute or even the Court's own 
Rule 39,41 which dealt explicitly with this power to expedite re-
view? This authority had not fallen into desuetude; it was exer-
cised only a few years before Ex parte Quirin in three important 
cases involving the constitutionality of New Deal legislation.42 
Of the Justices who heard the Quirin case, four might have been 
expected to remember the expedited procedure used in bringing 
these three cases to the Supreme Court from the court of ap-
peals: the Chief Justice and Justice Roberts, who had partici-
3lJ. Cushman, 28 Cornell L.Q. at 58 (cited in note 3). 
40. Until I examined the transcript of the oral argument in preparing this article, I 
thought that one of the Justices, probably Jackson, had mentioned the Court's expedit-
ing power. But I readily acknowledge that after 55 years of wear and tear, my recollec-
tion is less reliable than the transcript, which records no reference to the Court's power 
to bring the case up before action by the court of appeals. 
For a thorough analysis of the Court's power to grant certiorari in a case docketed 
in the courts of appeal before waiting for judgment there, see James Lindgren and Wil-
liam P. Marshall, The Supreme Court's Extraordinary Power to Grant Certiorari before 
Judgment in the Court of Appeals, 1<)86 S. Ct. Rev. 25lJ. 
41. For Rule 3lJ, see 306 U.S. 720 (llJ3lJ). 
Bennett Bosky informs me that he is certain that all of the Justices were familiar 
with the certiorari-before-judgment procedure. This increases my surprise that no one 
saw fit to bring this shortcut to Col. Royall's attention, once it became obvious that it 
was unknown to both him and the Attorney General and that they therefore thought 
that an appeal from the District Court of Appeals would seriously postpone action by 
the Supreme Court. Moreover, Justice Jackson observed during the argument about 
procedure that '"it is a question whether, in dealing with it, we should send this to some 
other court and endure a period of delay, or go ahead and decide it." Tr. at p. 505. This 
does not sound like the comment of a Justice who knew that the Court would not have 
to '"endure" so much as an hour of delay if, once Col. Royall docketed an appeal from 
the District Court to the Court of Appeals, the Court exercised its prerogative to grant 
certiorari before judgment below. Of course this was wartime, tensions were high, and 
even the Justices might overlook the details of a mundane but unusual judicial proce-
dure. Perhaps one could say of this feature of Ex parte Quirin that inter arma, silent ju-
dices. In the event, there was, of course, no delay; but there might have been if counsel, 
left in the dark by the Justices, had not stumbled on the certiorari-before-judgment pro-
cedure after the first day of oral argument. 
42. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 2lJ4 U.S. 240 (llJ35) (the Gold 
Clause Case); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 2lJ5 U.S. 330 (!lJ35) 
(holding the Railroad Retirement Act of Jl)34 unconstitutional); Carter v. Carter Coal 
Co., 2<)8 U.S. 238 (llJ36) (invalidating the labor provisions of The Bituminous Coal Con-
servation Act). 
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pated as members of the Court in all three cases; Justice Reed, 
who had represented a government agency in one case and 
served as Solicitor General when another was decided; and, 
above all, Justice Frankfurter, the New Deal's brooding legal 
omnipresence and the nation's leading academic authority on 
the Supreme Court.43 Indeed, in one of Frankfurter's books, he 
had observed that a 1925 decision granting certiorari before 
judgment "foreshadows more frequent exercise of this power. "44 
Of course, the Justices have no obligation to rescue a 
drowning lawyer, but there was an independent collegial rea-
son -compelling enough, one would have thought, to survive 
strict scrutiny-for calling attention during the oral argument to 
the possibility of expedited review. This reason is that the juris-
dictional objections pressed by Justice Frankfurter that made 
Colonel Royall squirm must also have troubled the Chief Jus-
tice, who in the first year that he was at the Court's helm faced 
the prospect that the drama of his summons to the Justices to as-
semble on short notice in a special summer session would dis-
solve into farce if they then had to twiddle their thumbs while 
the less august judges of the appellate court debated and de-
cided the issues already argued at length above. The Chief Jus-
tice was, of course, spared this embarrassment by the Court's 
exercise of its power to grant certiorari before judgment, which 
supplied it with nunc pro tunc jurisdiction. 
Was anything sacrificed by this expedited review? Seven 
years after Ex parte Quirin was decided, Justice Frankfurter 
joined with Justice Burton in protesting the grant of certiorari 
before judgment in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, in-
volving a Presidential order directing the Secretary of Com-
merce to seize and operate most of the nation's steel mills to 
forestall an impending strike during the Korean War. The dis-
senters asserted: 
The constitutional issue which is the subject of the appeal de-
serves for its solution all of the wisdom that our judicial proc-
ess makes available. The need for soundness in the result 
outweighs the need for speed in reaching it. The Nation is en-
titled to the substantial value inherent in an intermediate con-
sideration of the issue by the Court of Appeals. Little time 
43. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter and Harry Shulman, Cases and Other Authorities on 
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure 731 (Callghan, rev. ed. 1937) (citing two of these 
cases on the Supreme Court's "before judgment" appellate power). 
44. Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A 
Study in the Federal Judicial System 262 n.24 (Macmillan, 1928). 
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will be lost and none will be wasted in seeking it. The time 
taken will be available also for constructive consideration by 
the parties of their own positions and responsibilities. Ac-
cordingly, I would deny the petitions for certiorari and thus 
allow the case to be heard by the Court of Appeals.45 
On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter sometimes believed 
that "the need for speed" was paramount. In Brown v. Board of 
Education, according to his "law clerk for life," he "did some-
thing unprecedented," viz., he "had the Court put out an order 
inviting counsel in [Bolling v. Sharpe (involving school segrega-
tion in the District of Columbia)] to file a petition for certiorari 
which, the order said, would be granted so that the Court would 
have the case before it along with the cases coming from Kansas, 
Delaware, South Carolina, and Virginia."46 Bolling v. Sharpe, of 
course, raised an issue not present in the other cases: the legal 
status of school segregation in a geographical area not covered 
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Evidently, however, Justice Frankfurter thought the Supreme 
Court could dispense with whatever "wisdom" the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia could provide on this issue. 
Aside from the hectic flurry of papers in Ex parte Quirin, 
for the petitioners it was Tweedledum-Tweedledee whether the 
Court granted their petition for an "original" writ of habeas 
corpus or instead granted certiorari before judgment by the 
court of appeals; and this choice was equally inconsequential for 
the government. Moreover, in either case, the petitioners had to 
demonstrate that their case deserved expedited review; and this 
judgment was surely not affected by the ceremonial visit to the 
court of appeals that the Supreme Court demanded and blessed. 
Justice Frankfurter, to be sure, feared that the Court would be 
"deluged" with cases if it sanctioned the habeas corpus route. 
But why would that have swamped its docket, given that any 
litigant seeking certiorari can request that it be granted before 
judgment below? If anything, the conventional certiorari route 
would seem likely to generate more requests for expedited re-
45. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 937,938 (1952). When the 
case was heard on the merits, however, Justice Frankfurter concurred in the Court's de-
cision, which held that the President had invaded the jurisdiction of Congress in viola-
tion of the principle of separation of powers. !d. at 579. 
46. Philip Elman, interviewed by Normal Silber, The Solicitor General's Office, 
Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, /946-/960: An Oral History, 100 Harv. L. 
Rev. 817, 826 (1987). For Elman's status as a law clerk with lifetime tenure, see id. at 
817 and 832. 
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view; after all, it is open to all litigants and they are not penal-
ized for asking, while the habeas corpus route could be em-
ployed only if there is a complaining corpus, and this is an in-
herently limited category of cases. 
